Kenneth Arrow: Social choice and individual values. Wiley 1951.

Duncan Black: The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge UP 1958.

17638 Norbert Brunner/H. Mihara: Arrows' theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom
of choice. Math. Logic Quart. 46 (2000), 335-359.

17640 Beno Eckmann: Social choice and topology. Internet 2003, 8p.
Good starting point for mathematicians!

18945 Michael Eisermann: Le theoreme du dictateur. Internet 2005, 6p.

18944 Michael Eisermann: Arrovian juntas. Internet 2006, 23p.
Arrow's theorem generalized to partially ordered sets.

17641 Joel Franklin: Mathematical methods of economics.
Am. Math. Monthly 90/4 (1983), 229-244.

Allan Gibbard: Manipulation of voting schemes - a general result.
Econometrica 41 (1973), 587-601.

1329 Konrad Jacobs: Einführung in die Kombinatorik. De Gruyter 1983.

Jerry Kelly: Arrow impossibility theorems. Academic Press 1978.

Alan Kirman/Dieter Sondermann: Arrow's theorem, many agents and invisible
dictators. J. Econ. Theory 5 (1972), 267-277.

17639 H. Mihara: Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible
dictators. J. Math. Econ. 32 (1999), 267-287.

Prasanta Pattanaik: Strategy and group choice. North-Holland 1978.

Bezalel Peleg: Consistent voting schemes. Econometrica 46 (1978), 153-161.

Bezalel Peleg: Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees.
Jerusalem Hebrew UP 1982.

Mark Satterthwaite: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions.
J. Econ. Theory 10 (1975), 187-217.

Amartya Sen: Social choice theory. North-Holland 1982.